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Abstract: 
 We argue that fractional order (FO) differential equations are more suitable to 
model complex adaptive systems (CAS). Hence they are applied in replicator 
equations for non-cooperative game. Rock-Scissors-Paper game is discussed. It is 
known that its integer order model does not have a stable equilibrium. Its fractional 
order model is shown to have a locally asymptotically stable internal solution. A FO 
asymmetric game is shown to have a locally asymptotically stable internal solution. 
This is not the case for its integer order counterpart. 
 
1.Fractional order equations (FE) : 
Definition (1) [1]: A complex adaptive system (CAS) with emergence consists of 
interacting adaptive agents, where the properties of the system as a whole do not exist 
for the individual elements (agents) and are not caused by external effects. 
Definition (2): ''An emergent property of a CAS is a property of the system as a 
whole which does not exist at the individual elements (agents) level''. 
 Typical examples are the brain, the immune system, the economy, social 
systems, ecology, insects swarm, etc… 
 Therefore to understand a complex system one has to study the system as a 
whole and not to decompose it into its constituents. This totalistic approach is against 
the standard reductionist one, which tries to decompose any system to its constituents 
and hopes that by understanding the elements one can understand the whole system.  
Since this is quite difficult, mathematical and computer models may be helpful in 
studying such systems. 
 Recently [2] it became apparent that fractional equations naturally represent 
systems with memory. To see this consider the following evolution equation 
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there is no memory and 1/s if there is ideal memory hence the case of non-ideal 
memory is expected to be given by . In this case equation (1) 
becomes a fractional order differential equation: 
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where )(αΓ  is the Gamma function. This system has the following solution  
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 Following a similar procedure to study a random process with memory, one 
obtains the following fractional evolution equation 
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where P(x,t) is a measure of the probability to find a particle at time t at position x. 
For the case of fractional diffusion equation the results are 
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For the case of no memory .  )4/exp()2/1;(0 2zzM −=⇒=α
Moreover it has been proved that fractional order systems are relevant to fractal 
systems and systems with power law correlations [3]. 
Thus fractional equations naturally represent systems with memory and fractal 
systems consequently fractional order equations are relevant to CAS since memory 
and fractals are abundant in CAS systems. 
 
2. Fractional order calculus in non-cooperative games: 
     Game theory [4] is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions 
among rational players produce outcomes (profits) with respect to the preferences of 
the players. Each player in a game faces a choice among two or more possible 
strategies. A strategy is a predetermined program of play that tells the player what 
actions to take in response to every possible strategy other players may use.  
A game is non-cooperative if the players compete with each other hence they do not 
form collusions.  
A basic property of game theory is that one’s payoff depends on the others’ decisions 
as well as his. 
    The mathematical framework of the game theory was initiated by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern in 1944 . Also they had suggested the max-min solution for zero-
sum games. Stability concepts for non-cooperative games. 
To quantify this concept one may use [4] the replicator equation which intuitively 
means that the rate of change of the fraction of players adopting strategy i is 
proportional to the difference between their payoff and the average payoff of the 
population i.e. 
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where Π  is the payoff matrix. 
 Now since we have shown that fractional order equations are more suitable to 
model CAS, we study some examples of fractional order game theory using fractional 
order replicator equation: 
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To study the stability of the equilibrium solutions of (2) we use the result of Matignon 
[5] which has been generalized in [6] that the equilibrium solutions of the system (2) 
are locally asymptotically stable if all the eigenvalues  λ   of the characteristic roots 
satisfy 
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Obviously this condition is a relaxation of Routh-Hurwitz conditions which 
correspond to 1=α .  Moreover if the system is 1-dimensional then the stability 
condition becomes ].1,0(,0 ∈∀< αλ  Hence we have 
Proposition (1): The stability of equilibrium solutions for all non-cooperative 
symmetric games with only two strategies allowed is the same ].1,0(∈∀α  
 Now we present an example where a stable equilibrium solution does exist for 
01 >> α  but not for α =1. Consider the Rock-Scissors-Paper game with payoff 
matrix where strategy one is rock, strategy 2 is scissors and strategy 
three is paper. It is known that its integer order model does not have a stable 
equilibrium. Let x,y,1-x-y be the fractions of rock, scissors, paper adopters hence the 
fractional order replicator equation for this game are: 
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It is direct to see that there is an internal solution (1/3,1/3,1/3) and that it is locally 
asymptotically stable (3) if  
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Hence we have: 
Proposition (2): The internal solution (1/3,1/3,1/3) for the fractional order Rock-
Scissors-Paper game (4) is locally asymptotically stable if (5) is satisfied. 
 
 Some asymmetric games (where the set of strategies and payoff matrix of 
some players x differ from those of another set of players y  [4] e.g. if the players are 
males and females) are another example where the dynamics of the equilibrium 
solutions of the fractional order system significantly differs from its integer order 
counterpart. Consider the asymmetric game with the payoff matrices: 
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Where a,b,c,d are positive constants. Then the fractional order replicator equations for 
this game become 
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Where x,y are the fraction of adopters of the first strategy in both populations. This 
system admits an internal equilibrium solution 
x= d/(c+d), y=b/(a+b)  (8) 
Direct stability analysis shows that the characteristic equation of (7) at the internal 
equilibrium solution (8) is 
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i.e. both roots are purely imaginary. Using (3) one gets that the internal equilibrium 
solution is locally asymptotically stable if .01 >>α  
 
3. Conclusions: 
 Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are abundant in nature. Almost all 
biological, economic and social systems are CAS. Game theory is a useful tool in 
studying such systems. We have shown that fractional order systems are suitable to 
model CAS. Therefore fractional order game dynamics should be studied. This work 
is a first step in this direction. It is shown that in some cases e.g. rock-scissors-paper 
and asymmetric games the results for the fractional order case differs significantly 
from its integer order counterpart. 
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